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LYNCIDNG ETHICS: TOWARD A THEORY
OF RACIALIZED DEFENSES
Anthony V. Alfieri*
"I wonder what people would think if they found a nigger hanging on
Herndon Avenue. "1
INTRODUCTION

So much depends upon a rope in Mobile, Alabama. To hang
Michael Donald, Henry Hays and James "Tiger" Knowles tied up
"a piece of nylon rope about twenty feet long, yellow nylon. "2 They
borrowed the rope from Frank Cox, Hays's brother-in-law.3 Cox
"went out in the back" of his mother's "boatshed, or something like
that, maybe it was in the lodge."4 He "got a rope," climbed into the
front seat of Hays's Buick Wildcat, and handed it to Knowles sitting
in the back seat.s

So much depends upon a noose. Knowles "mad!! a hangman's
noose out of the rope,"6 thirteen loops in the knot, thirteen loops
"around" Michael Donald's neck, a "classic hangman's noose."7 A
hangman's noose "needs to be cut and burned right . . . so it won't
unravel."8 Both ends of the rope must be "cut off and burµed."9
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of
Miami School of Law. A.B. 1981, Brown; J.D. 1984, Columbia. - Ed.
I am grateful to David Abraham, Adrian Barker, Bill Blatt, Naomi Cahn, Richard
Delgado, Leslie Espinoza, Heidi Feldman, Clark Freshman, Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge,
Angela Harris, Amelia Hope, Alex Johnson, Sharon Keller, Edward LiPuma, Frank
Michelman, Dorothy Roberts, Robert Rosen, Peggy Russell, Frank Valdez, David Wilkins,
Robert Williams, and Eric Yamamqto for their comments and support.
I also wish to thank Marisa Gerard, Jessica Balduzzi, Darien Doe, Marlene Rodriguez,
and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance.
This article is dedicated to Adrian Barker.
1. Record at 1026, State v. Cox, No. CC-87-2143 (Ala. 1987) [hereinafter Record]. Rec
ord citations preserve the original text of the trial transcript except wllere it appears clearly
erroneous or ungrammatical.
2. Record at 1059-60.
3. See id. at 1055, 1059.
4. Id. at 1060.
5. See id. at 1063-64.
6. Id. at 1064.
7. Id. at 742. Morris Dees describes the thirteen loop knot as "standard Klan operating
procedure." See MORRIS DEES & STEVE FIFFER, A SEASON FOR JusucE: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF CML R!GHl'S LAWYER MORRIS DEES 212 {1991).
8. Record at 1064.
9. Id. at 1069.
·
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Tightly "pulled up" and left "swinging," Michael Donald's rope
"burned into the bark."1 0

So much depends upon a camphor tree. Hays and Knowles
"went out . . . driving around looking for someone to kill." n In
East Mobile,"over around David Avenue," they "came on Michael
Donald . . . kidnapped him and took him to Baldwin County and
killed him, and brought him back to Herndon Avenue and hung
him up" in a tree across the street from Hays's home.1 2
*

*

*

Early on the morning of March 21, 1981, a man discovered
Michael Donald's mutilated body hanging from a camphor tree on
the 100 block of Herndon Avenue in Mobile, Alabama.13 That
night,members of the United Klans of America,Alabama Realm,
burned a cross on the grounds of the Mobile County Courthouse.14
An autopsy found that Donald had been beaten,stabbed,strangled,
and then "hung up. "15

In 1983,

a Mobile County grand jury indicted Hays,the Exalted
Cyclops of the United Klans of America,for capital murder.16 At
trial,the jury found Hays guilty and recommended life without pa
role.17 The trial judge rejected the recommendation of the jury and
sentenced Hays to death. ls
In 1984, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Cox,also a mem
ber of the United Klans of America,for conspiracy to commit mur
der.19 After impaneling a jury and convening the trial, the trial
judge dismissed the indictment and discharged Cox,citing the Ala
bama three-year statute of limitations for criminal conspiracy. 20 In
1987, an Alabama grand jury reindicted Cox for murder. 21 Com
menced in 1988, the initial trial of the murder indictment ended in a
mistrial. Reconvened in 1989, a second trial resulted in a
conviction. 2
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 1072, 1075.
Id. at 1078-79.
See id. at 461-62.
See Hays v. State, 518 So. 2d 749, 752 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).

Record at 740-50, 751.

See Hays, 518 So. 2d at 751-52.
See 518 So. 2d at 751.
See 518 So. 2d at 751.
See Cox v. State, 585 So. 2d 182, 185 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
See 585 So. 2d at 185.
See 585 So. 2d at 185.
22. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
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Additionally, in 1985 a federal grand jury indicted Knowles, a
third member of the United Klans of America, for violating the civil
rights of Michael Donald.23 Knowles pleaded guilty to civil rights
violations in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis
trict of Alabama.24 The district court sentenced him to life impris
onment.25 In return for Knowles's guilty plea and his service as a
State witness against Hays, Cox, and other Klansmen, the federal
prosecutor recommended that Alabama forego concurrent prosecu
tion of Knowles for capital murder in state court.26

In

1984,

the Southern Poverty Law Center,27 acting on behalf of

Beulah Mae Donald, the mother of Michael Donald, filed a civil
rights action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama against the United Klans of America, Hays,

Knowles, Cox, and two other Klansmen seeking $10 million in dam
ages.28 In 1987, a jury found the Klan and its members guilty of
violating Michael Donald's civil rights and awarded Beulah Mae
Donald $7 million in damages.29

In this article, I take up the cause of Henry Hays, James
Knowles, and Frank Cox, the cause of the Ku Klux Klan and other
agents of racial violence in American history. I come to their cause
not out of sympathy but in pursuit of a larger project devoted to the
historical study of race, lawyers, and ethics in the American crimi
nal justice system. Provoked by the jurisprudence of critical race
theory ("CRT"),30 the project investigates the rhetoric of race or
"race-talk" in criminal defense advocacy and ethies within the con
text of racially motivated private violence.31 The purpose of this
long-term project is to understand the status of race, racialized de
fense strategy, and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics
23. See United States v. Knowle, No. CR83-00028 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
24. See Cox, 585 So. 2d at 185.
25. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
26. See 585 So. 2d at 185.
27. For an augmented history of the Southern Poverty Law Center, see MORRIS DEES &
STEVE FIFFER, HATE ON TRIAL: THE CASE AGAINST AMERICA'S MOST DANGEROUS NEO
NAZI (1993).
28. See DEES & FIFFER, supra note 7, at 222; see also BILL STANTON, KLANWATCH:
BRINGING THE Ku Kwx KLAN TO J USTICE 191-249 (1991).
29. See DEES & FIFFER, supra note 7, at 330-31.
30. See, e.g., CRITICAL RA.CE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MoVE
MENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CurrlN G EDGE
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An
Annotated Bibliography, 19 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); Symposium, Critical Race Theory, 82
CAL. L. REv. 741 (1994).
31. For discussion of the public-private distinction in the setting of racial violence, see
infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
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of criminal defense lawyering. Out of this understanding,I hope,
will come a general theory of racialized defenses grounded in the
normative ideals of moral community.
In a prior work,I searched the rhetoric of race in cases of ra
cially motivated black-on-white private violence by focusing on the
1993 trial of Damian Williams and Henry Watson in Los Angeles
County Superior Court on charges of attempted murder and aggra
vated mayhem,stemming from the beating of Reginald Denny and
seven others during the South Central Los Angeles riots of 1992.3 2
Close inspection of the Williams-Watson trial record suggests that
the rhetorical structure of criminal defense stories of black-on
white racial violence incorporates competing narratives of deviance
and defiance that engraft an essentialist dichotomy of good-bad
moral character on the racial identity of young black men.33 The
distillation of male racial identity into objective,universal catego
ries of black manhood distorts the meaning of racial identity and
the image of racial community.34 Moreover,the tendency of crimi
nal defense lawyers to privilege deviance narratives and to
subordinate defiance narratives in storytelling magnifies that distor
tion, inscribing the mark of bestial pathology into the texture of
racial identity and community. The American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Profes
sional Responsibility3s countenance such deformity by allowing
racialized or color-coded criminal defense strategies to survive un
regulated under neutral accounts of liberal contractarian and com
munitarian legal theory.36
Calling for remedial regulation in racialized contexts such as the
Williams-Watson trial, I proposed an alternative ethic of profes
sional responsibility animated by principles of race consciousness,
contingency,and collectivity.37 A strong version of this alternative
ethic directs criminal defense lawyers to reject the use of deviance
based racialized strategies unless such strategies are necessary to
frustrate, by means of jury nullification, a racially discriminatory
prosecution.38 A weak version entreats defense lawyers to join
32. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995).
33. See id. at 1304, 1309.

34. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 800, 801 (1996).
35. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILilY (1980).
36. See Alfieri, supra note 34, at 801; see also Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1320.
37. See Alfieri, supra note 34, at 802; see also Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1340.
38. See Alfieri, supra note 34, at 802.
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their clients in collaborative deliberation over the meaning of racial
identity and injury within a counseling dialogue devoted to moral
character and community integrity.39
Unsurprisingly, these remedial prescriptions sparked swift and
acute criticism.40 Robin Barnes, for example, denounced the reme
dial scheme as unprecedented, unworkable, and likely unconstitu
tional.41 Furthermore, she condemned the underlying interpretive
analysis of the Williams-Watson trial record for mistakenly entan
gling social and legal strands of race-talk, misjudging the harm in
flicted

upon black racial identity

and

community,

and

misconceiving the criminal defense lawyer's duty to advocate on be
half of individual client interests, even when preservation of those
interests demands the use of racialized narratives.42 For Barnes, the
eradication of racial prejudice from the criminal justice system ne
cessitates a regime of legal neutrality, not a regime of race-con
scious ethics rules.43
Grand intentions notwithstanding, Barnes's dedication to neu
trality consigns to folly her campaign aimed at purging the criminal
justice system of racial prejudice.

In

the context of racial violence

and racialized legal discourse, neutrality is not merely elusive, it is
largely untenable. Broadly or narrowly construed, the color-coded
rhetoric of legal discourse affords little chance of or room for neu
tral speech on matters of racial significance. Moreover, dedication
to neutrality accepts the harms of racial injury as inevitable and,
worse, unremarkable. That the harms are suffered by the victims
and agents of racial violence, as well as by their cohort communi
ties, seems of no moment to Barnes.
The threshold premise of this article, and its allied research, is
the recognition and condemnation of racial injury within the dis
tinct, though sometimes overlapping, borders of public and private
violence. The instant tum to racial rhetoric in the circumstance of
white-on-black private violence, specifically in the case of lynching,
strains that border distinction. Gauged by any measure, the polit
ical violence of lynching seems to override the public-private dis
tinction commonly posited by legal advocates and adjudicators. Yet
_
39. See id.
40. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the
Road Less Traveled, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 788 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the
First Amendment, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1030, 1069-70 n.183 (1995).
41. See Barnes, supra note 40, at 789-90, 792.
42. See id. at 789-93.
43. See id. at 791, 794.
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here, tailored carefully to the facts presented in the case of Michael
Donald, the distinction seems to hold and, equally important, to
prove rhetorically and morally instructive.
The enormous breadth of the subject of lynching in America,
spanning two centuries and crossing interdisciplinary boundaries,
coupled with a scarcity of archival court collections, especially trial
records, dictates a somewhat improvisional initial approach to the
rhetoric of lynching cases.44 The starting point, staked out in this
introductory article, is an effort to map competing theories of racial
ized defenses arising out of lynching prosecutions. Building on this
effort, the next article will survey the varied forms of racialized de
fenses fashioned against lynching prosecutions. A third article will
chart the development of racialized defenses in lynching-related
civil rights actions. Together, the articles will lay the groundwork
for a fuller account of the history of racialized defenses in Ameri
can criminal and civil rights law.
To the extent that it assumes a theory-driven posture toward
sociolegal practice, the instant approach will doubtless stir protest.
Detecting an "impatience to theorize,"45 some may condemn the
approach for privileging abstract theoretical design over contextual
ized reflection.46 To be sure, epistemological hierarchy of any sort
warrants careful scrutiny. The hazards of error and misreading are
always great. But the same hazards attend anthropological,47 inter
pretive,48 and empirical49 investigations. No methodology is with44. A comprehensive search for archival court records requires the wide-ranging review
of state and county court documents. 1\vo library collections provide useful aid in organizing
such a search: the Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo
ple, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.; and the News Clippings
File of the Tuskegee Institute, Hollis Burke Frissell Library, Tuskegee, Alabama.
45. Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43

HASTINGS L.J. 853, 859 (1992).

46. See id.; see also Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Improving the Practice of Law, 2
CLINICAL L. REv. 385, 402-04 (1996); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive

Poverty Law: A Practice-Based Critique ofthe Storytelling Aspects ofthe Theoretics ofPrac
tice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 889 (1995).
47. See CLIFFORD GEER1Z, AFTER THE FAcr: T wo CouNTRIES, FouR DECADES, ONE
.ANnmoPOLOGIST 96-135 (1995); Peter Just, History, Power, Ideology, and Culture: Current
Directions in the Anthropology of Law, 26 LAW & SoCY REv. 373 (1992) (review essay);
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of lnterdis
ciplinarity, 1994 U. ILr... L. REv. 597.
48. See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: To
ward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAw & SoCY. REv. 197 (1995); Diane Reay, Insider Per
spectives or Stealing the Words out of Women's Mouths: Interpretation in the Research
Process, 53 FEMINIST REv. 57 (1996).
49. See Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the
Search for a Post-empiricist Sociology ofLaw, 15 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 155 (1990); David M.
Trubek & John Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program,
or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989).
.
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out peril. Although broad, the project advanced here strives for a
contextual account of the law of criminal lawyering and ethics in
the hope of capturing some sense of the theory and practice of ra
cial violence in American legal history.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the narra
tive form and racialized substance of lynching defenses. Part II ex
amines rival theories of lynching defenses, notably jury
nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity. Part III
analyzes alternative ethical justifications of lynching defenses under
modem and postmodern visions of jurisprudence. Part IV proposes
a reconstructed ethic of lynching defenses informed by the norms of
virtue, citizenship, race consciousness, and spirituality.
I.

LYNCHING

HISTORIES

The lynching of Michael Donald at the hands of the Ku Klux
Klan sounds themes echoed throughout the history of lynching in
America: difference, hate, violence, and community.so Plainly, a
full account of that history, and of the place of the Klan in its pro
gress,51 exceeds the scope of this article. The main thrust of this
article addresses neither the progress nor the prosecution of lynch
ing,52 but rather the legal defense of racially motivated violence.
Symbolic of the physical and interpretive violence of race, lynching
and its legal defense raise issues common to the postmodern study
of law and the politics of difference,53 especially the contested poli50. On the history of American lynching, see JESSE D. AMES, THE CHANGING CHARAC
TER OF LYNCHING (1942); JAMES E. Cun.ER, LYNCH-LAW: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES (1905); WALTER WHITE, ROPE & FAGGOT.
A BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE LYNCH (1929); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO , THE NAACP CRUSADE
AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980).
51. Historians divide the evolution of the Ku Klux Klan into three periods corresponding
to the late nineteenth century Reconstruction-era, the post-World War I era of the 1920s,
and the post-World War II era of the civil rights movement For Reconstruction-era histo
ries, see DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE FIRST CENTURY OF THE Ku
KLUx KLAN 1865-1965 (1987); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE Ku KLUx KLAN
CoNSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971); WYN CRAlG WADE, THE FIERY
CRoss: THE Ku KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 31-116 (1987).
On the revival of the Klan in the 1920s, see KATHLEEN M. BLEE, WOMEN OF THE KLAN:
RACISM AND GENDER IN THE 1920s (1991); NANCY MACLEAN, BEHIND THE MAsK OF Cmv
ALRY: THE MAKING OF THE SECOND Ku KLUX KLAN (1994).
On the rise of the modem Klan in the post-World War II and civil rights-era, see DAVID
H. BENNETT, THE PARTY OF FEAR: THE AMERICAN FAR RlGHr FROM NATIVISM TO THE
MlUTIA MOVEMENT 273-331 (1995); PATSY SIMS, THE KLAN (1978).
52. For a review of lynching prosecutions, see JAMES H. CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND
THE LAW 13-24 (1933); EVERETI'E SWINNEY, SUPPRESSING THE Ku KLUX KLAN: THE EN
FORCEMENT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 1870-1877, at 180-204, 316-40 {1987).
53. On postmodemism and legal practice, see LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEo. L.J. 2567 (1993).
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tics of the racial trial.54 The legal defense of lynching, for example,
involves the identity-making function of legal narrative,55 the social
construction of race,56 and the culture and cognitive psychology of
bias.57
The product of an apartheid system of rhetorical and spatial
dimensions, the American trial court provides the arena for the in
tersection of law, lawyering, ethics, and race. An important litera
ture explores the role of judges and courts in the history of racial
oppression both here5s and abroad.59 Curiously, this literature
omits sustained treatment of the complicity of lawyers in legitimiz
ing the juridical structures (such as law, legal discourse, and institu
tional procedure) of racial oppression.60
The emergence of an outsider jurisprudence in the legal acad
emy during the last decade offers a chance to cure this omission.
Guided by new voices of color61 probing the connections of law,
race, and identity,62 the jurisprudence is evolving rapidly under the
54. The literature on political trials is extensive. See, e.g., POLITICAL TRIALS (Theodore
L. Becker ed., 1971); AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981); Georgia
W. Ulmschneider, Rape and Battered Women's Self-Defense Trials as "Political Trials": New
Perspectives on Feminists' Legal Reform Efforts and Traditional "Political Trials" Concepts, 29

SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 85 (1995).
55. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Les
sons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
56. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observa
tions on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994).
57. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck·
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Steven L. Winter, Transcen
dental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L.

REv. 1105 (1989).
58. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED! ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); Wtlliam E. Nelson, The Impact ofthe Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
59. See, e.g., STEPHEN ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAw AND LIBERTY IN Soura
.AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY (1992); Martin Chanock, Criminological Science and the

Criminal Law on the Colonial Periphery: Perception, Fantasy, and Realities in South Africa,

1900-1930, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 911 (1995).

60. Noteworthy exceptions concern lawyer complicity in the Nazi and South African state
regimes. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of
Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989); Stephen Ellmann, Law and Legitimacy in South
Africa, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 407 (1995).
61. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
62. For studies of racial identity, see Juoy SCALES-TRENT, Norns OF A WHITE BLACK
WOMAN: RACE, CoLOR, CoMMUNITY (1995); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV,
1241 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths ofIdentity: Individual and Group Portraits ofRace and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263 (1995); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Ac·
cent, Antidiscrimination Law and A Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329 (1991); Francisco Valdez, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: A Meditation on Iden·
tity and Inter-Connectivity, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WoMEN's STUD. {forthcoming 1996); Mary
Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 2 AFR.-AM. L. & POLY. REP. 222 {1995) (book review). See
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prodding of CRT ,63 Asian,64 and LatCrit scholars.65. The advent of
the CRT and fledgling LatCrit movements dislodges the tradition
ally subordinate position of race and ethnicity in American law and
ethics. Thus dislodged, the meaning of color in black,66 Asian,67
Latino/a,6s and Native American69 advocacy takes on new and un
settled import. This instability enables critical scholars to reassess
the written and social texts of the law exhibited in the courtroom.70
Textual reassessment implicates narrative71 and discourse theory,72
and thereby highlights the rhetoric of the criminal trial.73
Reimagining the rhetoric of racialized advocacy and,ethics at trial
or in the law office creates transformative opportunities to move
generally AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN 1,Aw AND CuLTURE (Dan Danielsen & Karen

Engle eds., 1995).
63. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical
Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CAL. L. REv. 7f!>7
(1994); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV.
741 (1994); Eleanor Marie Brown, Note, The Tower of Babel· Bridging the Divide Between
Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream" Civil Rights Scholarship, 105 YALE L.J. 513 (1995).
64. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward. an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1243 (1993); Jim
Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REv. 145 (1994).
65. See, e.g., Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Perspective in
Legal Discourse, 1 HARv. LATINO L. REv. (forthcoming 1996); Symposium, Latinaslos, Lat
Crit Theory and the 21st Century, 85 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
66. Compare Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1745 (1989) with Colloquy: Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques of Legal
Academia, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1844 (1990).
67. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story ofAfrican American/
Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581
(1993).
68. See Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un/ Masking the Self While
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 185 (1994).
69. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of
European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31
Aruz. L. REv. 237 (1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race
Practice, 95 MICH. L. REv. 741 (1997).
70. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in-the

Adversarial Criminal Process -A Critique ofthe Role of the Public Defender and a Proposal
for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 743 (1995);'Cara W, Robertson, Representing "Miss Liz
zie": Cultural Convictions in the Trial of Lizzie Borden, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351 (1996).

71. See Bmny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REv. 485 (1994); Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative
Tactics in the
,
Citadel and VMI Litigation, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1996).
72. See Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: To
wards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Herbert A.
Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J.

™��

.

73. For studies of criminal trial rhetoric, see generally Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy
Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. '55 (1992); Philip
N. Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences upon a Defendant's Closing Argument
to a Jury 18 VT. L. REv. 721 (1994).
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legal practice toward an appreciation of the importance of racial
identity and community.
Consider the idea of the racialized defense. By racialized, I
mean a defense coded, overtly or covertly, in the rhetoric of color.
Garnered from interdisciplinary research on race and the criminal
law process,74 judicial reports of racial and ethnic bias in the court
room,75 and the writings of CRJ'76 and ethics77 scholars, color
coded claims and defenses pervade the sociolegal discourse of
American law, culture, and society. The resurgence of the black
rage defense78 and the emergence of the variegated cultural de
fense79 reflects the protean nature of that discourse. Taken to
gether, these defenses illustrate the intertwined character of legal
and social discourse about race.
Alluding to this entwined quality, Alan Hunt observes "that
legal life and everyday social life are mutually conditioning and
constraining and that elements of legal consciousness play an active
part in popular consciousness and practices."80 To Hunt, law "en
ters into the way that life is imagined, discussed, argued about, and
fought over."81 The act of "imagining, talking, arguing, and fight74. See generally CoRAMAE R. MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE - A QUESTION OF CoLoR
(1993); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT - RA.CE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995).
75. See, e.g., Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Judicial
System, Report ofthe Oregon Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Judi
cial System, 73 OR. L. REv. 823 (1995); Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Report of the Special Committee on Gender to the D.C. Circuit Task
Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 84 GEo. L.J. 1657, 1893 (1996). See generally Todd
D. Peterson, Studying the Impact ofRace and Ethnicity in the Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 173 (1996).
76. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Baye
sians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994).
77. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8
GEo. J. LEGAL Ennes 1 (1994); Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers
ofthe Court: Why the First Amendment ls No Bar to Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic
Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL Ennes 781 (1996).
78. See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories ofCriminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity ofthe
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 14 N.C. L.
REv. 731 (1996). See generally WILLIAM H. GRIER & PruCE M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968).
79. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36
(1995); Alison D. Renteln, A Justification ofthe Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437 (1993); Leti Volpp, (Mis)ldentifying Culture: Asian Women
and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 57 (1994).
80. Alan Hunt, Law, Community, and Everyday Life: Yngvesson's Virtuous Citizens and
Disruptive Subjects, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 173, 178-79 (1996) (reviewing BARBARA
YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CrrizENS, DISRUPTIVE SUBJECTS: ORDER AND COMPLAINT IN A
NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993)).

81. Id. at 179.
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ing" in turn "shapes the law."82 In this way, the racialized organiza
tion of law, lawyering, and ethics infects and, conversely, is infected
by the racialized composition of popular culture and everyday so
cial life in America.83 The fusion of racialized legal and social dis
course is not simply confined to high-profile cases.84
The prominence-of the racialized defense in contemporary soci
olegal discourse underscores the crucial function of narrative and
storytelling in criminal law and lawyering. Dismantling racialized
storytelling in a criminal context reveals two core presuppositions
that shape the traditional criminal defense paradigm: partisanship
and nonaccountability.ss The precepts of client partisanship and
moral nonaccountability spawn discrete rhetorical forms of color
coded narrative. The play of narrative, Rebecca French notes,
"breaks open a discipline by creating new linguistic and representa
tional forms."86 Here, the focus is on the racialized criminal court
room, its race-neutral ethical precepts, and its color-coded narrative
forms.
The examination of racialized courtroom narratives requires an
analysis of hierarchy and status in legal rhetoric. Consider the rhet
oric of colorblind constitutionalism. The colorblindness trope87 is
basic to the discourse of American law and jurisprudence. Yet, in
sofar as it denies the social significance of racial categories, it pre-

82. Id.

83. See generally RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL,
CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REAUTY (Toni Morrison ed.,
1992).
84. See Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us": The Mass Media, Law and Afri
can Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 523 (1993); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making
of Invisible People, 10 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965, 967-70 (1995).

85. See Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1321.
86. Rebecca R. French, Of Narrative in Law and Anthropology, 30 LAW & SoCY. REV.
417, 421 (1996) (review essay). Explicating these narrative forms, French remarks:
In this period of late or postmodernism, single-person narrative is viewed as a safe and
effective technique both for avoiding false generalizations that might be attacked (the
false coherence of essentialist stereotypes) and for creating a new form of social science
that includes, instead of dismisses, multiplicity and diversity.
Id. at 419; see also Benjamin L. Apt, Aggadah, Legal Narrative, and the Law, 73 OR. L. REv.
943, 968 (1995) ("Legal narrative often attempts to expose the shortcomings of current laws
and reveal the effect of laws on society.").
87. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 CoLuM. L. REv.
1060 (1991); Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to
the Courtroom, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 1 (1995).
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serves racial hierarchy and status inequality.ss In this respect,
colorblind rhetoric operates as a "status-preserving"89 discourse.
The law of lawyering which governs the criminal defense of ra
cial violence in lynching cases also constitutes a status-preserving
discourse. In practical effect, it protects the racial hierarchy of
white dominance and black subordination embedded in the racial
ized narratives of American law, culture, and society. Within fed
eral and state courtrooms, this status hierarchy appears legitimate
and nondiscriminatory.
This legitimacy rests in part on the rhetoric of colorblindness.
Cloaked in this rhetoric, the Model Code and the Model Rules con
done the use of racialized narrative in criminal defense advocacy.
Construing the law of lawyering as a racial status law and its lan
guage as a status-preserving discourse challenges the race-neutral
standing of the Model Code and the Model Rules. Central to this
challenge is an explanation of precisely how legal rules

covertly

en

force status privileges "once justified in overtly hierarchy-based dis
courses, with reference to other, less contested, social values,"90
such as citizenship and community.
II.

LYNCHING, DEFENSES

Lynching defenses embody a distinct narrative form of the
racialized defense. This Part considers three varieties of lynching
defenses: jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished ca
pacity. The defenses of jury nullification and victim denigration
make overt use of hierarchy-based racial discourse. Nullification
rhetoric invokes the power and prerogative of white

racial

supremacy. Denigration rhetoric conjures up a vision of black ra
cial inferiority where victims are worthy of killing but unworthy of
protection or redress. The defense of diminished capacity, by con
trast, makes covert use of hierarchical racial discourse through ref
erence to the social values of community and civic virtue. For white
lawbreakers, civic commitment lies only to segregated community.
The racial hierarchies encoded in the rhetoric of nullification,
denigration, and diminished capacity denote difference in legal and
social status. The elaboration of difference follows the logic of ad88. See Jody Annour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733 (1995).
89. The tenn belongs to Reva Siegel. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2185 (1996).
90. Id. at 2177.
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versarial justice,91 sharply distinguishing and dividing claims of
community racial entitlement into oppositional stands. Despite
complaints of excess, the model of adversarial justice expressly tol
erates deceptive and sometimes false or frivolous claims.92 Bound
up in false hierarchies of natural superiority and inferiority, the nar
rative signification of racial difference is likewise tolerated.
The reconfiguration of difference-based racial hierarchy re
quires alteration of the signifying function ·of lynching defenses. Al
teration may be accomplished through either nonreflexive or
reflexive approaches to the law of criminal lawyering.93 A
nonreflexive, or discretionary, approach draws upon traditions of
lawyer independence to disavow racialized strategies. This unilat
eral approach conceives of the criminal defense lawyer as an unbri
dled moral activist. A reflexive or collaborative approach appeals
to civic republican traditions to encourage lawyer-client delibera
tions of racial identity, moral character, and dialogic community.
This bilateral approach restores the Brandeisian vision of "socially
responsible advocacy."94
Both discretionary and collaborative approaches to criminal
lawyering reaffirm the bonds that link the criminal law to moral
character9s and community. To prevail, however, reaffirmation
must confront the ascending rhetoric of excuse in criminal defense
91. For deft exposition of this logic, see David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in
THE Gooo LAWYER: LAWYERS' RoLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83 (David Luban ed., 1983);
see also Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary Sys
tem?, 79 CAL. L. REv. 313 (1991).
92. See R.J. Gerber, Victory v. Truth: The Adversary System & Its Ethics, 19 Aruz. ST.
L.J. 3 (1987); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 403 (1992). Compare Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Differ
ent Mission": Reflections on the "Right" To Present a False Case, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1 25 {1987) with John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Re
sponse to Professor Subin's Position on the Crimina Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J.
.
LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987).
93. Jack Balkin suggests two approaches to ideological demystification: nonreflexive and
reflexive. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104
YALE L J. 1935 {1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND TiiE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH (1993)). According to Balkin, a nonreflexive approach "sees ordinary citizens
as suffering from a pathology, a defect that needs to be cured through the analyst's exper
tise." Id. at 1984. A reflexive approach, by comparison, "understands the relationship be
tween the analyst and analysand as a disagreement about what is good, a disagreement that
may be due to misunderstandings and ideological blinders on both sides." Id. at 1984-85.
94. Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE LJ. 1445, 1471 (1996).
95. See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Charac
ter to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, Soc. PHIL. & POLY., Spring 1990, at 59; Samuel H.
Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Re
sponsibility, 67 IND. LJ. 719 (1992).
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advocacy.96 Intenveaving gender,97 race,98 and the social environ
ment,99 the concept of excuse limits individual blame and collective
accountability.100 At the same time, it implicates the meaning of
shame and shaming.101
Dan Kahan defines shame in terms of disgrace. Shame, accord
ing to Kahan, is "the emotion that a person experiences when she
believes that she has been disgraced in the eyes of persons whom
she respects."102 As such, it illuminates the conjunction of culture,
community, and the criminal justice system.103
Lynching defenses encourage cultural and community resistance
to shame104 by inviting collective defiance of legal and nonlegal
sanctions.10s The defenses urge the renunciation of shame in favor
of sympathy for white lawbreakers.106 Instead of commonality with
96. See R. JAy WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 118-53 (1994);
Richard J. Bonnie, Excusing and Punishing in Criminal Adjudication: A Reality Check, 5
CoRNELL J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 1 (1995); Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers:
Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671 (1988); Michael
S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 13 CAL. L. REv. 1091 (1985).
97. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REv. 3 (1994); Deborah W.
Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CruMINOLOGY 80
(1994).
98. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER,. A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GoETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
99. See K.D. HARRIES, CRIME AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1980); Richard Delgado, "Rotten
Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense ofSevere Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEO. J. 9 (1985).
100. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511 (1992).
101. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); GABRIELE
TAYLOR, PRIDE, SHAME, ANO GUIL'I-: EMOTIONS OF SELF-ASSESSMENT 53-84 {1985); John
Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993); Dan M. Kahan, What
Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 630-52 (1996).
102. Kahan, supra riote 101, at 636 (footnote omitted).
103. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1880 {1991).
104. See Martha Craven Nussbaum, Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's
Criticism ofPlato, in EssAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S Ennes 395, 427 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed.,
1980) (finding merit in the centrality of "character-friendship" within the Aristotelian polis,
especially in its "capacity for refining self-criticism through emulation and the sense of
shame" {footnote omitted)).
105. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 {1996).
106. Segregated pronouncements of racial sympathy mark the loss of Gordon Wood's
notion of a "modem humanitarian sensibility." For Wood, that loss implies the abandonment
of the Jeffersonian belief in the equality of the moral worth and authority of every individual.
Abandonment of this ideal, he cautions, poses a threat to civil society. See Gordon S. Wood,
Thomas Jefferson, Equality, and the Creation of a Civil Society, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133,
2141-42 (1996); see also GORDON s. Wooo, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU·
TION {1991).

·
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people or communities of color, the defenses incite separation and
detachment.
A.

Jury Nullification

The racialized defense of jury nullification binds communities to
racial difference �d subordination. Construed as an expression of
community moral sentiment, nullification seeks to rectify perceived
inequalities of racial status.107 Out of deference to the subordinate
racial status of black jurors and defendants, Paul Butler explains
that nullification occurs when a jury harbors objections to a law
either on its face or as applied to a particular defendant and, ac
cordingly, "disregards evidence presented at trial and acquits an
otherwise guilty defendant."1os Borrowing Butler's formulation for
the purpose of upending it, the theory of jury nullification pro
pounded here licenses white jurors to "approach their work cogni
zant of its political nature and their prerogative to exercise their
power in the best interests " of the white community.109
Nullification defense strategies recognize race as a rhetorical
presence in criminal jury selection and deliberation.110 Recent
literature on the criminal jury111 confirms the magnitude of this
presence. Race taints jury selection112 notwithstanding the diverse
demographic factors impinging on the process of voir dire.113 Simi
larly, race contaminates jury deliberation in spite of the constitu107. On racial bias in criminal trials, including the determination of guilt, see Shari Lynn
Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611 (1985).
108. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995). Butler adds:
Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is guilty of
the crime with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not guilty, the jury refuses
to be bound by the facts of the case or the judge's instructions regarding the law. In
stead, the jury votes its conscience.

Id.
109. Id. at 715.
110. Cf. Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC.
566, 577 (1994).
111. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 99-141, 207-39 (1994); NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JusnCE: JURORS'
NOTIONS OF THE LAW 172-95 (1995).
,

112. See Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis of
Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection, in READING RAcrsM AND
THE CRIMINAL JusnCE SYSTEM 87-100 (David Balcer ed., 1994); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W.
Butler, Sources ofRacial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NATL.
BLACK L.J. 238 (1994).
113. See Chris F. Denove & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Jury Selection: An Empirical Inves
tigation of Demographic Bias, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 285 (1995).
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tional aspiration of political insulation and cross-sectional
community representation.11 4
For the white defender of black lynching, the criminal jury trial
provides a forum for citizen political participation aimed at curing
the problem of white political, social, and economic disenfranchise
ment.ns Deployed as an "audience-based theory of argument,"116
nullifi,cation rhetoric imbues the racialized speech found in opening
and closing statements, direct and cross examinations, and even ob
jections. The rhetoric vocalizes the political astonishment111 of the
white community toward lynching prosecutions. For defenders of
that community, the ethical task is to"'distinguish between what can
be said and what ca.mlot be said"11 8 in the service of racial
supremacy._
The evidence of community astonishment apparent in jury nulli
fication points to an entrenched sociolegal consciousness of racial
hierarchy. Demonstrated in public through the media11 9 and in pri
vate through talk of conspiracy or hoax,1 20 hierarchy-instilled racial
consciousness molds the sociolegal reality of the criminal law. The
rhetorical stratagems of prosecution and defense teams reflect that
reality. 121 The constitution of the racialized self and racial commu114. See Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 (1976);
Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voice; The Case for Half-and-Half Juries in
Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1994); see also Marina Angel,
Criminal Law and Women; Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who
Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CruM L. REV. 229 (1996).
.

115. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
'
CoRNELL L. REv. 203 (1995).
116. Saunders, supra note 110, at 577.
117. Cf. Louis E. Wolcher, The Man in a Room: Remarks on Derrida's Force of Law, 7
LAW &.CRmOUE 35, 40 (1996).
118. Id. at 63.
119. See Susan F. Hirsch, Interpreting Media Representation of a "Night of Madness":
Law and Culture in the Construction ofRape Identities, 19 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1023 (1994).
120. See Kath eryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71
IND. L.J. 593 (1996); see also Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: An
tiblack Conspiracy Theorizing & The Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. S.T. U. L. REV. 1021
(1995).

121. See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting
"Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CruM L. REv 1, 36 (1995).
.

.

Pilcher remarks that:
[C]riminal prosecution serves a broadly educational function as well as an individually
punitive one: public views of blameworthiness are significantly influenced by what is
prosecuted, just as what is criminalized is influenced by public disapproval. Provided the
enforced norm is perceived as morally legitimate, and the violator thus blameworthy, the
norm is intemaliz�d and accrues power as a socializing force. Criminal enforcement in
the absence of socialization of the norm, however, can have the opposite effect; if the
public would not collectively react to violation of the norm with condemnation then the
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nity mirrors the same reality.122 Forged from the hierarchical ten
sion of racial status domination and subordination, both the self
and community suffer from the deformities of negation.
B.

Victim Denigration

The racialized defense of victim denigration rests on the nega
tion of racial identity in law and culture.123 Negation fragments ra
cial identity124 and scatters . deformed images throughout the
'
criminal process.125 CriiniD.al defense lawyers employ this imagery
in the "elaboration of difference. "126 Racial difference establishes
the predic�te for the segregation of the white self and the black
other. Lynching defenders seek to enforce racial segregation by af
firming the status of the white lawbreaker and demeaning the body
of the black victim.121
particular prohibition has no distinctive social power. This, in tum, fosters the dimin
. ished respect for the law- . . . .

Id.
122. See Margaret Jane R;adin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on
Reconsidering Personhdod, 14 OR. L. REV. 423, 430 (1995). ("For appropriate self-constitu

tion, both strong attachment to context and strong possibilities for detachment from context
are needed. Because these requirements seem to oppose each other, they exist in tension.
This tension causes problems for theory and contradictory tendencies in practice.").

123. See JAN NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, WHITE ON BLACK: IMAGES OF AFrucA AND
BLACKS IN WESTERN POPO� CULTURE 51-63, 132-41, 152-56, 174-78 (1992); see also Adele
Logan Alexander, "She's No Lady, She's a Nigger": Abuses, Stereotypes, and Realities from
the Middle Passage to Capitol (and Anita) Hill, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA:
THE LEGACY OF nm Hn.L-THOMAS HEARINGS 3 (Anita Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan
eds., 1995); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Hill-Thomas Hearings - What Took Place and
What Happened: White Male Domination, Black Male Domination, and the Denigration of
Black Women, in RACE, GENDER AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF nm HILL
THOMAS HEARINGS, supra, at 26.
124. See Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop
and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147; Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace To
Society:" The Use of Criminal Profiles and Its Effects on Black Males, 38 HowARD L.J. 629
(1995).
125. See Kevin Brown, The Social Construction of a Rape Victim: Stories of African
American Males About the. Rape of Desiree Washington, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 997; Ariela
Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 267 (1995); Bernard E. Harcourt, Imagery and Adjudication in the Criminal Law:
The Relationship Between Images of Criminal Defendarits and Ideologies ofCriminal Law in
Southern Antebellum and Modern Appellate Decisions, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1165 (1995); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 Tur.. L. REV. 1739 (1993); Lawrence
Vogelman, The Big Black Man Syndrome: The Rodney King Trial and the Use of Racial
Stereotypes in the Courtroom, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (1993).
126. See Chanock, supra note 59, at 935 (discussing the "elaboration of difference"
through law).
127. Modem criminal law jurisprudence discloses a growing interest in the position of the
victim. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, Wrra JusncE FOR SoME: V 1C11MS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995); Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MlcH. L.
REV. 1596 (1996) (reviewing FLETCHER, supra).
·
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The denigration defense centers on the racially subordinate sta
tus of black victims.12s Affirming this unequal status renews long
standing claims of moral, physical, mental, and genetic inferiority.
The claims provide the historical rationale not only for lynching,
but also for eugenic segregation and sexual sterilization.129 They
also supply the basis for assigning qualities of bad or immoral char
acter to black victims.
To lynching defenders, black victims possess immoral character.
Infirmities of character render such victims undeserving of privacy
or dignity. The deterioration of victim-specific privacy interests at
tends the steady collapse of the boundary line separating public
from private realms in law and liberal theory. Calling upon the
state for juridical vindication hastens that collapse.130 State action,
in a significant sense, propels the victim of private violence into a
public role.
Acting in concert with the state, criminal defense lawyers frame
the identity of victims in the public sphere of the courtroom.131
Framing in advocacy causes revictimization in death. Like victim
impact statements, victim denigration statements "permit, and in
deed encourage, invidious distinctions about the personal worth of
victims."132 Such distinctions, Susan Bandes comments, contradict
the principle of moral equality in the criminal law.133
Increasingly embroiled in Supreme Court jurisprudence,134
victim-related statements demonstrate the force of moral passion
and emotion embedded in racialized defenses.135 The racially im
passioned rhetoric of victim denigration demands judgments of nar128. See Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988);
Patricia Wtlliams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127 {1987).
129. See EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN TitE DEEP Sourn
{1995); Edward J. Larson, "In the Finest, Most Womanly Way:" Women in the Southern
Eugenics Movement, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119 {1995).
130. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Conditions
and Welfare, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 931, 941 (1995) {"The sphere of privacy protected by
liberal rights largely evaporates once the individual invites in state assistance.").

131. See generally Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 T EX. J. WoMEN & L. 277
{1993); Patricia Y. Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the "Second Assault": Legal
Organizations' Framing of Rape Victims, 19 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 853 {1994).
132. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L.
REv. 361, 406 {1996).
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 {1989).
135. See Markus D. Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe ls Ready to
Strike, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 85 {1993); Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991
SUP. Cr. REV. 77.
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rative inclusion and exclusion. B andes describes narrative
judgment as "unavoidably normative" and "value-laden."136 In her
view, the issue "is always which narratives we should privilege and
which we should marginalize or even silence."137
Victim denigration statements privilege narratives of white in
nocence and resistance antagonistic to black identity and the corol
lary value of black self-esteem.138 The narratives reproduce racial
hierarchies of moral worth, emphasizing the role of black depravity
even at death. Denigration rhetoric of this kind ventures to estab
lish an "empathetic link"139 between white lawbreakers and white
jurors, thereby coloring the judgment of culpability.140 In the same
way, the diminished capacity rhetoric of racial delusion seeks out
the empathetic ratification of segregated community.
C.

Diminished Capacity

The racialized defense of diminished capacity combines commit
ment, community, and delusion to free white lawbreakers of moral
and criminal culpability. Freedom follows from the commitment to
segregated community. Heralded in the case of lynching, that com136. Bandes adds:
Once we acknowledge the instrumental, political nature of legal narrative, we can enter
the difficult discussions of why marginalization of some narratives occurs, how to sepa
rate the wrongly excluded narratives from those that ought to be excluded, how to in
clude the wrongly marginalized narratives in legal discourse, and how to ensure that they
are actually heard.
Bandes, supra note 132, at 387-88 (footnotes omitted).
137. Id. at 409. Death penalty abolitionists, for example, urge the silencing of victim
impact narratives on the ground that they "incline the sentencer in favor of death, thus im
pugning the reliability of the jury's decision as an objective benchmark of the evolving stan
dards [of decency]." Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional
Construct: The Supreme Court's Evolving Standard of Decency for the Death Penalty, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455, 520 (1996). The resultant death sentences, accordingly, "are
invalid gauges of societal standards of decency and should be given little probative force in
the constitutionality determination." Id. at 521.

138. For a discussion of self-esteem and related values, see Roy L. Brooks, Analyzing
Black Self-Esteem in the Post-Brown Era, 4 TEMPLE Por.. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 215, 217
(1995). Brooks defines self-esteem in terms of two components. The first, called specific or
personal self-esteem, "measures an individual's belief in his or her own virtue and moral self
worth." Id. The second, called personal efficacy, "reflects a sense of personal competence,
efficacy, or control." Id.

139. Bandes explains:
More often, the difficulty for the trier of fact is in making the empathetic link with the
defendant, in seeing the defendant's shared humanity. In either situation, though, the
real importance of empathy lies in its countemarrative aspect - it enables the trier of
fact to imagine himself in the place of another.
Bandes, supra note 132, at 377.
140. Cf. Gary D. LaFree et al., Jurors' Responses to Victims' Behavior and Legal Issues in
Sexual Assault Trials, 32 S oc. PROBS. 389 (1985); Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Run
ner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1201 (1992).
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mitment triggers the diminished capacity defense. Proponents of
the defense contend that the extreme nature of white commitment
to community-wide racial supremacy induces a state of mind bor
dering on delusion. Thus misguided, white lawbreakers perform
acts of racial violence without individual or collective remorse.
Like jury nullification and victim denigration, the defense of di
minished capacity illustrates the pivotal role of counsel in perpetu
ating racial violence. The defense directs counsel to put the white
lawbreaker's state of mind in legal controversy. It is counsel's duty
to assert client claims of diminished capacity and incompetency,
whether attributable to emotional disturbance or to insanity.141
The claim of racial delusion satisfies that duty.142
Excusing white lawbreakers from liability on the ground of
delusion-inducing racial emotion dilutes the moral force of criminal
defense advocacy. Emotion is fundamental to this dilution.143 The
diminished capacity defense depicts white lawbreakers caught up in
the emotion of populist resistance.144 Discarding the image of
white savagery, the defense offers the alternative impression of
white innocence, an innocence filled with a commitment to commu
nity solidarity. Comparable to duress,145 this commitment to soli
darity brings to bear elements of psychological and physical
coercion upon individuals enmeshed in the culture of white
supremacy,146 recasting violence as "prejudiced irrationality."147
The image of the community-minded white innocent evokes
race and the racial body. Tami Spry speaks of "the body that is
visible as a cultural symbol."14s The diminished capacity defense
141. See, e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role ofthe Criminal Defense Lawyer in Represent·
ing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis.
L. REv. 65.
142. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 16
B.U. L. REV. 113 (1996).
143. On the role of emotion in criminal Jaw, see Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum,
Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996).
144. For an example of the populist justification for lynching, see the description in
Nancy MacLean, The Leo Frank Case Reconsidered: Gender and Sexual Politics in the Mak·
ing ofReactionary Populism, 18 J. AM. HIST. 917, 920, 943-44 (1991).
145. See generally Jos HUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 259-73 (1987);
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its
Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331 (1989).
146. Cf. David S. Rutkowski, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging
the Moral Gap in Existing Law, 10 NoTRE DAME J.L. Ennes & PuB. POLY. 137 (1996).
147. The phrase originates with Kathryn Abrams. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479, 2524 (1994).
148. Tami Spry, In the Absence of Word and Body: Hegemonic Implications of "Victim"
and "Survivor" in Women's Narratives of Sexual Violence, 18 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 27, 29
(1995) (emphasis omitted).
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puts forward the black body as a cultural object. According to this
defense, the killing of the black body, indeed the act of lynching
itself, constitutes an act of empowerment, an act of human agency
vital to the identity construction of the white self and the white
community. The defense prevails despite its intimation of social
pathology.149
The modern jurisprudence of the criminal law supports the
claim of racial violence as pathology.150 In its current rendition, the
claim suggests that the presence of racially coercive151 pathology
negates the free will152 and responsibility153 of the white law
breaker.154 This reading, however, flips the standard legal dichot
omy of agent-victim or perpetrator-victim on its head.155 Kathryn
Abrams explains that "the categories of perpetrator and victim are
understood to be simple and unitary: the perpetrator enjoys full
agency, and the victim either lacks as a categorical matter, or loses
through the experience of discrimination, virtually all capacity for
self-direction."156 Yet, under the racial delusion defense of agent
as-victim, it is the white perpetrator who lacks the cognitive capac
ity for independent moral direction and the black victim who invites
racial retribution. Discordantly, in a manner akin to disability and
incompetence, this cognitive impairment actually warrants greater
lawyer solicitousness157 precisely because it renders moral con
science and punishment irrelevant.158
149. Kathryn Abrams cites a similar tension experienced by women's defense lawyers
attempting to navigate "between the need to defend battered women who kill (often through
the use of defenses such as 'learned helplessness') and the need for battered women, and
women as a group, to project an image reflecting some capacity for agency." Kathryn
Abrams, Complex Claimants and Reductive Moral Judgments: New Patterns in the Search for
Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV. 337, 362 n.104 (1996).
150. On pathology and criminal law, see Stephen

L.J. 527 (1996).

J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEo.

WERTHEIMER, COERCION 144-75 (1987).
MICHAEL S. MooRE, Acr AND
CRIME: THE PHrr.OSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 113-65
151. On coercion, see ALAN

152. For a discussion of the metaphysics of volition, see

(1993).
153. See generally Wallace, supra note 96, at 51-83; Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of
Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245 (1992).
154. Cf. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated, Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1882-85 (1996).
155. See Abrams, supra note 149, at 348.
156. Id. at 348; see also Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Femi
nist Legal Theory, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 304, 324-29 (1995).
157. See Jeff McMahan, Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice, 25 PHIL. & PuB.
AFF. 3, 35 (1996) (claiming "indirect or derivative moral reasons to be specially solicitous
about the well-being of the cognitively impaired").
158. See Stephen
(1994).

J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1634-37

·
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Deriving a lynching defense from the social-psychology of racial
delusion privatizes the social issue of racism. Privatization ignores
the social undercurrents of hate crime in America.159 The move
from the public to the private sphere, and the corresponding shift
from moral evil to scientific pathology, allows the legal profession
to evade responsibility for its complicity in maintaining racial
violence.
III.

LYNC HING ETHICS

Lynching ethics describes the normative system that criminal
lawyers employ to justify the racialized defenses of jury nullifica
tion, victim denigration, and diminished capacity. Reassembled
here from modern and postmodern conceptions of criminal defense
representation, that value system sacrifices collective moral deliber
ation as a regulative ideaP6° to the zealous advancement of individ
ual freedom.161 Indeed, the systematic objective of criminal
defense advocacy is to preserve individual client freedom. Conven
tionally, freedom comprises both positive and negative rights. Yet,
for the criminal defendant, negative rights acquire principal empha
sis in erecting a bulwark against state encroachment upon political
and civil liberties.
To ensure the preservation of ordered liberties, defense attor
neys seek to establish more stringent standards of state conduct in
criminal cases.162 To that end, they espouse the principles of liberal
legalism and the rhetoric of rights.163 The presumption of inno159. See generally JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEvrrr, HATE CRIMES: THE R1sINo TIDE OF
BmoTRY AND BLOODSHED (1993); Lu-IN WANO, HATE CRIMES LAw (1996); James B. Jacobs
& Jessica S. Henry, The Social Construction of a Hate Crime Epidemic, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 366 (1996); Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Nor
mative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MrCH. L. REv. 320 (1994).
160. On Kantian moral deliberation, see Paul Guyer, The Value of Agency, 106 ETHICS
404, 405-20 (1996) (book review).
161. For a discussion of liberty as either a collective social reaction or an elite ideology,
see Warren Sandmann, The Argumentative Creation of Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS
CoNST. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996). .
162. Barton Ingraham explains:
The most common rationalization given for the higher and stricter standards and
rules in criminal cases is the greater severity of its sanctions (punishments) as well as its
social consequences (stigma, disrepute). Another common rationalization is the greater
need in criminal cases for protection of the individual against the massive forces and
resources of the state.
Barton L. Ingraliam, The Right of Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the Burden of
Proof, and a Modest Proposal: A Reply to O'Reilly, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 559, 574

(1996).
163. French explains: "Rights talk, which points toward rules and principles and cur
rently has great moral weight, is based on a story about the relationship between the state
and its component individuals just as individual narratives are." French, supra note 86, at 426.
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cence, the right to remain silent, and the burden of state proof be
yond a reasonable doubt1 64 all testify to the strength of liberalism in
asserting private rights against the state and its penal incursions.
Grasping the injunction of zealous criminal defense advocacy
requires engagement with liberal theory, particularly its vision of
state power, corruption, and malice. Consistent with the tradition
of liberal political theory, David Luban attributes state power, and
its abuse, to advantages in police and prosecutorial resources, crimi
nal procedure, political legitimacy, and bargaining position.165
Based on this balance of state advantages, Luban recommends the
professional norm of zealous advocacy to criminal defense law
yers.1 66 Nonetheless, suspicious of presumptive absolutes, he warns
that this role-derived norm is rebuttable.167
Luban's broadly framed version of the zealous advocacy defense
contrasts sharply with William Simon's narrowly tailored formula
tion.1 68 Simon rejects the categorical use of zealous advocacy in the
criminal sphere, endorsing only the selective use of aggressive de
fense tactics when warranted by substantive justice objections to
unjustly harsh or discriminatory punishment, especially if traceable
to political disenfranchisement.1 69 That categorical rejection
evinces a fundamental disagreement over the meaning and require
ment of deception in criminal defense advocacy. For Luban, crimi
nal defense advocacy necessitates deceptive defense tactics.11o For
Simon, deception imperils the moral self-conception of defense law
yers and, consequently, risks alienation and loss of moral
integration.1 71
Deception is central to the ideology and practice of racialized
defenses. Although generally absent from accounts of the motiva
tions of criminal defense law yers,1 72 deception permeates the advo164. See generally Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1301 (1977).
165. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 173052 (1993).
166. See id. at 1755-57.
167. See id. at 1757-58; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN EnnCAL
STUDY 129-33 (1988).
168. See William H. Simon, The Ethics ofCriminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1703
(1993).
169. See id. at 1724-25.
170. See Luban, supra note 165, at 1760-61.
171. See William H. Simon, Reply: Further Reflections on Libertarian Criminal Defense,
91 MICH. L. REv. 1767, 1772 (1993).
172. See, e.g., Roy B. Flemming, If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public
Defenders in America's Criminal Courts, 14 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 393 (1989) (book review);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defend-
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cacy function, distorting client identity and condemning the search
for truth, even the contingent truth realized in particularized con
texts.173 Both modem and postmodern accounts of crimin�l de
fense practice renounce the search for truth. Uninterested in the
moral commitments accompanying fragmentary moments of histor
ical truth, the accounts find relevance only in the machinery of ad
versarial justice.
A.

The Modernist Justification

The modernist justification of racialized defenses hinges on law
yer commitment to the institutional values of the adversarial sys
tem. Performing within this system, criminal defense lawyers
internalize adversarial norms, meanings, and roles.174 Norm
intemalization, Allan Gibbard explafus, "involves tendencies to
ward action and emotion, tendencies that are coordinated with the
tendencies of others in ways that constitute matched adaptations, or
are the results of matched adaptations."175
Consider the norm of role-differentiated morality.176 Applied
to the matched prosecution-defense adaptations of the adversarial
system, role-based differentiation severs professional morality from
personal and community morality, enabling the criminal defense
lawyer to serve in the guise of Monroe Freedman's "champion
against a hostile world."177 Rooted in the Sixth Amendment notion
ers, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1239 (1993); Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibil·
ity, and Angry Young Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433 (1994).

173. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a
Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 39-43 (1994).
174. See ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE
JUDGMENT 55-82 (1990) (distinguishing between "accepting a norm" and "being in the grip of
a norm"); see also Arthur Isak Applbaum, Professional Detachment: The Executioner of
Paris, 109 HARv. L. REv. 458, 473-86 (1995); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark ,Tzmes, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL Ennes 31, 86 (1995} (urging
restoration of parity between the two modes of norm-adoption: internalization and accept·
ance); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 903, 947 {1996)
(asserting that "people usually do not choose norms, meanings, and roles; all of these are
(within limits) imposed").
175. GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 71.
176. See ALAN H. GOLDMAN, TJiE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL Ennes 2033, 155 (1980); David Luban, Introduction to THE Ennes OF LAWYERS, at xi, xii-xiv (David
Luban ed., 1994); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1 {1975).
177. Monroe E. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATII U. L. REv.
331, 332 (1987).
.

February 1997]

Racialized Criminal Defense

1087

of adversarial fairness,178 the norm of role-differentiated morality
commands "fair process" and, by extension, effective counsel.179
The modernist account of lynching ethics defines the role
derived norm of effective representation in terms of the traditional
axioms of neutral partisanship18° and moral nonaccountability.181
Partisanship, Rob Atkinson explains, "entails advancing client ends
through all legal means, and with a maximum of personal determi
nation, as long as the ends are within the letter of the law." 182 Neu
trality, Atkinson adds,

"lets the professional claim personal

disinterest in, or even antipathy toward, client ends and moral
nonaccountability for helping to advance them."183
The complementary norms of neutral partisanship and . moral
nonaccountability envisage criminal law practice as a technical,
apolitical craft.184 The practice of racialized defenses .clearly entails
technical expertise. But neither the accumulation nor the applica
tion of that expertise precludes politics, in this case the identity
making and community-defining politics of race.
The rhetorical politics of racialized defenses proclaims the
Model Code and the Model Rules colorblind to matters of identity
and community. Declarations of neutrality and neutral princi
ples,185 however, obscure racial hierarchy. The doctrinal pretense
of impartially tracking evidence of discriminatory intent186 supplies
no resolution to the establishment of racial privilege. And yet, this
178. See, e.g., STEPHEN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1984); Gary Goodpaster,
On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CluM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY 118
(1987).
179. See Stephen B. Bright, The Electric Chair and the Chain Gang: Choices and Chal
lenges for America's Future, 71 NolRE DAME L. REv. 845, 851 (1996); Gerald F. Uelmen,
2001: A Train Ride: A Guided Tour of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 58 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. Winter 1995, at 13.
.
180. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1989) ("A lawyer
should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in
advocacy upon the client's behalf."); see also James R. Elkins, The Moral Labyrinth of Zeal
ous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U. L. REv. 735 (1992).
181. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 613; Murray L. Schwartz, The Profession
alism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673-74 (1978).
182. Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism of
The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE LJ. 177, 185 (1995).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 186; Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951).
185. See Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance ofNeutral Principles, 78 CowM. L.
REv. 982 (1978); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1992); Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
186. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993).
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is the answer contained in race-neutral proclamations emanating
from the politics of racial "nonrecognition." 187
This same rhetorical politics pronounces jury nullification, vic
tim denigration, and diminished capacity as expressions of private
preferences outside the public reach of juridical sanction. Constru
ing racialized defenses as private litigant preferences revitalizes the
public-private distinction in law and lawyering.1ss The reinstantia
tion of that dichotomy encases criminal defense advocacy in the lib
eral rhetoric of privacy189 and autonomy.190 Privacy talk shields
racialized advocacy from ethical regulation, effectively granting at
torneys and their clients immunity from public scrutiny.
No concession of immunity should go unqualified. To the extent
that racialized defenses blend private choice and state enforcement,
they come within the meaning of state action.191 In this way, the
defenses expose lawyers and clients to potential liability under anti
discrimination laws as well as relevant disciplinary codes. The
treatment of nullification, denigration, and diminished capacity ver
dicts as the reasoned, deliberative products of a democratic commu
nity fails to insulate lawyers against such liability. Rather, that
treatment obliterates the civic republican ideal of public reason.192
The rhetorical politics of race in fact undermines the principles of
public, reasoned dialogue that stand at the core of civic
republicanism.193
187. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of
Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 363, 366 (1996) ("Color blindness pennits racial subordination
to continue by leaving intact institutions created by centuries of official and private oppres
sion."); see also Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in An·
tidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1993); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle:
On Race, Process, and Constitutional Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1994); Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991).
188. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the PublidPrivate Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1992); Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the PublidPrivate Distinc
tion, 10 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 319 (1993); Symposium, The Public-Private Distinction, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1289 (1982).
189. Cf. Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 CoLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119
(1992); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and The Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Violence of Privacy, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 973 (1991).
190. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, and Possibili
ties, 1 YALE. J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1988).
191. In 1991, the Supreme Court announced that a private party's discriminatory conduct
at trial constitutes state action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
192. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 469 (1996).
193. See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory
and the Moral Foundation ofDeliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 329 (1994); Lawrence
B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN Dmoo L. REV. 729 (1993).
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The Postmodernist Justification

The postmodernist justification of racialized defenses discards
claims of neutrality and stability in law for the contested politics of
ideology.194 Under the postmodern account of lynching ethics, ef
fective representation heeds what Kenneth Anderson calls the "in
strumentalist, transactional, mobile ethos of the contemporary
professional."195 That ethos, Anderson remarks, devolves into a
devotion to "purely instrumental technique, without a conception
of or commitment to the social .'ends' of professional knowledge,
except as they are temporarily defined by the market for expert
services."196 Indeed, for the postmodernist, professional devotion
imposes a duty to muster the "best arguments" on behalf of a cli
ent197 - arguments that, according to Sanford Levinson, amount to
the "crassest, most instrumental" defense possible.198
Under the racialized defenses of jury nullification, victim deni
gration, and diminished capacity, the "best argument"
credence through white community acceptance.

gains

Rendering the

moral quality of legal argument contingent on local commullity ap
probation trivializes larger ethical and normative considerations.199
Lawyering affords no escape from the political and community
commitments of normative judgment. Even when the reduction of
professional service to "technical assistance" tends "to reduce
moral concerns to matters of individual taste, if not idiosyn
cracy,"200 it leaves the politics of normativity201 in advocacy to col
lective discernment.
Conceived in personal or collective terms, the postmodern poli
tics of normativity problematizes the most basic moral aspiration.202
194. See Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACTICES 215-29 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Robert L. Nelson & David
M. Trubek, Arenas ofProfessionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra, at 177-214; William H. Simon, The Ideology
ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29.
195. Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96
CoLUM. L. REV. 1062, 1073 (1996) (review essay).
196. Id. at 1063.
197. See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Perform
ance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POLY. 495, 506 (1996).
198. See id.
199. See Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74
TEXAS L. REV. 523, 527-28 (1996).
200. Atkinson, supra note 182, at 186.
201. See Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1991).
202. See Blumenson, supra note 199, at 531.

1090

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 95:1063

Implicitly, moral aspiration carries a claim of objective truth.203
Parsing that claim, Eric Blumenson notes that however disparaging
of value neutrality, a morality-centered aspirational ethics must still
"presuppose that objectively correct answers exist and that there is
an impartial position from which to distinguish legitimate from ille
gitimate uses of power. "204
Levinson condemns the objective posture of an aspirational eth
ics as incapacitating.205 For Levinson, the dismissal of a properly
instrumental legal argument for reasons of illegitimacy, or the con
ditioning of retainer and representation on the presentation of a
single argument, amounts to incompetence, even if the argument
disposed of makes the lawyer "retch. "206 This instrumental position
suggests not only the acceptance of adversarial norms,207 but also
the tolerance of formal neutrality exemplified in the treatment of
race in the courtroom. It also repudiates Michael Tigar's vision of
the false, and apparently rigged, elements of the criminal tria1.2os
The clustering of formal, adversarial norms around the purport
edly neutral, objective practice of racialized defenses confirms
Gunther Teubner's view that norms " 'constitute' fields of social ac203. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB.

A.FF. 87, 89 (1996).

204. Blumenson, supra note 199, at 529. The presupposition of objectivity and impartial
ity also afflicts the experiential decisionmaldng of pragmatism. See James R. Hackney, Jr.,

The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products Liability: A Case Study in American
Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 443, 452 (1995) (noting that pragmatists'

"appeal to experience was not a value neutral appeal: the implications of the experience
appealed to by individual pragmatists was shaped by their own value orientation").
205. See Levinson, supra note 197, at 507.
206. Id.
207. See GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 75; Luban & Millemann, supra note 174, at 86-87.

Gibbard observes:
Accepting a norm is something that we do primarily in the context of nonnative discus
sion, actual and imaginary. We take positions, and thereby expose ourselves to demands
for consistency. Nonnative discussion of a situation influences action and emotion in
like situations. It is then that we can speak of norms as governing action and emotion,
and it is through this governance that nonnative discussion serves to coordinate. Inter
nalizing a norm is likewise a matter of coordinating propensities, but the propensities are
of a different kind: they work independently of nonnative discussion.
GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 75.
208. See Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 101, 109 (1995). Tigar notes:
In the courtroom arena, there is a symbolic equality of defense and prosecution. We
understand that in fact the balance of resources almost always tips in favor of the gov
ernment, and this is particularly so in high-profile cases where high officials have an
nounced an intention to take the defendants' lives. The defendant is not given a choice
whether to participate in the unequal contest. The inequality is just another device of
the system-called-justice. The lawyer's job is to expose the device, deploying the signs of
justice against the signs of system-called-justice. The signs ofjustice include empowering
the jury, calling on the tribunal to respect its oath, exposing contradiction - bringing
out solid reasons why the judge and jurors should go beneath the surface of things.
Id. at 109-10.
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tion,'' and that such "fields of action in turn reconstitute legal
norms."209 For the postmodern defender of lynching, adversarial
norms concededly legitimize the language of racial hierarchy and,
hence, reproduce race relations of domination and subordination.
By the same admission, relations of racial superiority and inferiority
reentrench norms of inequality. To break down hierarchical race
relations, the next Part proposes a reconstructed ethic of lynching
defenses based on a commitment to a morality of character and
community grounded in the norms of virtue, citizenship, race con
sciousness, and spirituality.

IV.

LYNCHING Ennes RECONSTRUCTED

Both Simon and Luban draw on the notion of moral commit
ment in constructing the concepts of ethical discretion210 and ac
tivist counseling.211 Although laudable, these shared visions of
moral action fail to resolve the controversial status of race, racial
ized strategy, and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics
of criminal defense lawyering. Confronting the status, strategy, and
substance of racial representation in lynching necessitates amplifi
cation of the ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
The ethic of race-conscious responsibility demands a transfor
mation of the liberal regime of colorblind criminal defense practice
from the perspective of race. Race-ing the ethics of lynching de
fenses challenges the identity-making practices of criminal lawyers,
especially the tendency to associate racial difference with deviance
and inferiority and, thus, to reenact racial subordination in advo
cacy. That challenge requires the reintegration of law, morality,
and legal ethics. Reintegration flows from the adoption of founda
tional norms and values.
The call for the restoration of values in the legal profession reso
nates in the current ethics literature.212 The prevailing criminal de
fense ethics of lynching sustains a thin normative conception of
professionalism deficient in virtue, citizenship, community, and
spirituality. Mired within this conception, alternative notions of
209. Gunther Teubner, Regulatory Law: Chronicle of a Death Foretold, 14 CURRENT
,
LEGAL THEORY 3, 22 (1996).
210. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083,
1083-84 (1988).
211. See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 637, 640-41.
"
212. See, e.g., MAR.Y ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE Crus1s IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAIUNG IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
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professionalism213 and regulation214 lapse into repose. The silence
of that repose is attributable to the liberalism-based exclusion of
public moral pronouncement215 from the lawyer-client relationship.
Liberalism offers a private, contractarian basis for the lawyer-client
relationship that emphasizes the priority of technique, procedure,
and perspectivelessness.216
Envisioning the lawyer-client relationship as a private, contrac
tual order permits the exploration of certain background regulatory
norms,211 such as reciprocity.21s The norm of reciprocity treats the

racialized defenses of jury nullification, victim denigration, and di
minished capacity as the efficient, transactional product of lawyer
client value consensus. Rather than assail the defenses for ineffi
ciency,219 citing for example the external costs to character and
community, the ethic of race-conscious responsibility attacks the
premise of private, moral consensus as overbroad. On this view,
reciprocity proves counterfactual and moral dialogue degenerates
into an expedient maneuver. The normative embrace of virtue, citi
zenship, multi-racial community, and spirituality signals the re
demptive search of moral activism.

A.

Virtue

The norm of virtue strengthens the moral content of the ethic of
race-conscious responsibility through legal reasoning and prac213. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: Ennes IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 196-217 (1991); Robert W. Gordon &
William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES, supra note 194, at 230-57; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift:
Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1229, 1256-63 (1995).
214. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799
(1992).
215. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCON1EN'I': AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 123-67 (1996) (discussing civic virtue and th!} public good in the early
American republic).
216. For a discussion of perspectivelessness, see Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Foreword: To
ward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NATL. BLACK L.J. 1,2 (1989).
217. Cf. Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749-53
(1996).
218. See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction ofSocial Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2055, 2063 (1996). Pildes contends that the norms of reciprocity contain a specific or
local strand which "sustains ongoing relationships between specific parties . . . in direct, one
to-one interactions . . . [as well as a generalized strand which] is a more global predisposition
to be motivated by norms of reciprocity and cooperation even when acting in new settings or
with new agents outside some previously established relationship." Id. at 2064 (footnote
omitted).
219. See David Chamy, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Rela
tionships, 144 U. PA L. REv. 1841, 1848-52 (1996) (claiming that inefficient norms "favor the
members of concentrated interest groups, at the expense of more diffuse members").
.
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tice.22° Cultivating virtue through practical reasoning221 dictates
more than the performance of lawyer role morality.222 It requires
seizing upon the expressive function of law.
Many laws, Cass Sunstein comments, contain an expressive
component.223 According to Sunstein, such laws " 'make a state
ment' about how much, and how, a good or bad should be val
ued."224 The statement materializes in the form of "social
meanings, social norms, and social roles. "225 By design, this mate
rial valuation alters existing norms and shapes external behavior.226
The logic of this expressive influence depends on a shared sense of
appropriate normative direction.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules combine expressive
functions and justifications. The regulatory decrees of lawyer com
petence and candor illustrate these common tendencies. For exam
ple, the Model Rules mandate "competent representation" of a
client, specifying the "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary" to satisfy the nature and circum
stances of a disputed matter.227 Justification for requisite levels of
attention and preparation rests on the gravity of "what is at
stake."228 Additionally, the Model Rules require lawyer candor to
ward the tribunal and, to a lesser degree, the opposing party and
counsel.229 Justification of the duty of candor obtains from the obli
gation "to avoid implication in the commission of perjury or other
falsification of evidence."23° This obligation allegedly ensures fair
competition in the adversarial procedure of marshalling contested
evidence.231
220. See, e.g., Reed Elizabeth Loder, When Silence Screams, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1785
(1996); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice ofLaw as Moral Discourse, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW
YER 231 (1979).
221. See J. David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, 106 Ennes 694 (1996)
(defining the object and justification of practical reasoning).
222. See Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 Mo. L. REv. 853,
947-77 (1992).
223. See Sunstein, supra note 174, at 964.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1995); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSraIUTY DR 6-101 (1980).
228. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 cmt. (1995).
229. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at Rules 3.3, 3.4 (1995).
230. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 cmt. (1995).
231. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 cmt. (1995).
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Despite the expressive force and influence of lawyer compe
tence and candor decrees, misconduct in the prosecution232 and de
fense of criminal proceedings continues, especially with respect to
race.233 The persistence of lawyer misconduct suggests that the pos
itivist discourse that pervades the Model Code and Model Rules
lacks a shared sense of appropriate normative direction sufficient to
foster moral virtue.234 Revitalizing lawyers' sense of virtue through
legal education and skills training is likely to prove futile.

Put

starkly, the standard conventions of legal education and training af
ford little opportunity for the experiential learning and critical re
flection needed to inculcate virtue. Even with the benefit of such
opportunity, the resulting sense of professional virtue, backed by a
law-induced vision of justice, falls subject to widespread public
suspicion.235
Practical wisdom stocks no means to rescue virtue from the im
poverished training of legal education. If virtue is to be salvaged, it
will be recovered from the values of citizenship, multi-racial com
munity, and spirituality.236 Each of these spheres provides a source
of identity crucial to the attainment of virtue. Kenneth Anderson
asserts the importance of the individual possession and develop
ment of "diverse and cross-cutting identities" extracted from the
multiple domains (such as religion and family) of civil society.231
For Anderson, ethical conduct "depends upon the possession of
strong identities outside the profession:"238 Representing race with
competence and candor hinges on the strength of attorney-client
identities outside of the law and ethics of lawyering.
The identity-making power of citizenship, community, and spiri
tuality builds moral character and virtue from sources outside the
law.239 Like the practice of criminal defense representation, the
practice of virtue in advocacy entails both competence and candor.
232. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Dis·
cretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 890-910 (1995).
233. See Elizabeth L. Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror:- An Approach to the
Identification of Prosecutorial Racism, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1992).
234. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for
Thirst?, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETIIICS 311 (1987); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Be
yond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 lowA L. REv. 901 (1995).
235. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 S. CAL.
L. REV. 47, 83 (1995).

236. On the virtue ethics tradition, see Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good
Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885 (1996).
237. Anderson, supra note 195, at 1072.
238. Id.
239. Endorsing the tum to virtue ethics in the discussion of lawyerly professional respon
sibility, Atkinson urges that:
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Competence alone, however, furnishes no moral assurance of ad
vancing a greater social good.24° Candor at least proffers an "open
ness to others"241 essential to the creation of a racially diverse
community.242
B.

Citizenship

The norm of citizenship contributes a transformative notion of
community obligation to the ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
Although political, the norm betrays doubts about the suitability of
lawyers' political judgments.243 The political character of the norm
instead pertains to the meaning of lawyer community participation
in matters of democratic citizenship that cut across racial lines.
The norm of citizenship encourages lawyer crosscutting commu
nity participation in an effort t� achieve a fuller individual sense of
collective, multiracial identity. Unlike David Abraham's "complete
citizen,"244 the lawyer-citizen seeks more than a_ "relatively unfet
tered" sense of community membership.and self-govemance.245 In
deed, he seeks the richness of racially diverse citizenship, not
merely a state of relative self-sufficiency.246
[W]e must widen our perspective from a focus on particular acts, whether the acts are
conceived in tenns of their agent's motives or their effects on others. We must include
the agent's general dispositions, vices, and' virtues-in a word, his or her character. In
focusing on character and its development, we see how we are made to do what we do,
and, conversely, how what we do and why we do it make us who we are. Most impor
tantly, we learn who we want to be.
Atkinson, supra note 182, at 217 (footnotes omitted).
240. John DiPippa observes that the loss of moral community deprives a lawyer of the
moral assurance that his work offers morally efficacious service. See John M.A. DiPippa,
Lon Fuller, the Model Code, and the Model Rules, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 303, 356 (1996).
241. Atkinson, supra note 182, at 220; see also J. Kevin Quinn et al., Resisting the Individ
ualistic Flavor of Opposition to Model Rule 3.3, 8 GEO. J, LEGAL Euncs 901 (1995).
242. Cf. Vogelman, supra note 125, at 575 (in�isting that "[a]rguments catering to racism
or other prejudices are not legally relevant and surely assault the dignity of our courts and
are degrading toward our system of justice" (footnote omitted)). See generally, Colin Croft,
Note, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposalfor Deliberative Moral
Community, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256, 1321-51 (1992).
243. Eisgruber explains:
It is not obvious that lawyers are especially good at reading [constitutional] credos or
that they know more than most people about things that a constitutional credo might
describe-values, aspirations and characteiistics of political identity. The conventions of
the profession might actually deaden the political sensibilities of lawyers, making them
especially ill-suited to read credos.
Eisgruber, supra note 235, at 83.
244. David Abraham, Liberty without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a ·
"Negative Citizenship" Regime, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 51 (1996).
245. Id.; see also Junrra N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CmzENsHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLU
s10N (1991); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL Euncs 241 (1992).
246. On self-sufficiency and citizenship, see James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic
Citizenship, and Welfare Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfare, 14 WASH. U. L.Q. 103,
· •

·
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The concept of citizenship enlivening the lawyer-citizen ideal
reaches beyond the private, self-identity of the sovereign subject to
hold up a public, racially integrated version of the self. Frederick
Dolan finds the self "constituted through a plurality of judgments
and narratives of others."247 For Dolan, this public self is a product
of the "plural and variable character of human interaction, espe
cially symbolic or discursive interaction."248 Even when that inter
action embroils the dichotomies of racial hierarchy, this public self
may acquire what Dolan describes as "a distinctive, coherent, and
stable identity."249 According to this analysis, identity evolves
through language and intersubjective action. The presence of an
alternative, public self demonstrates the "linguistic and interpretive
character of identity."250
The public, self-identity of the lawyer-citizen gives rise to broad
community obligations in criminal defense practice. Those obliga
tions include the building and strengthening of interracial commu
nities.251 Although the communitarian account of race and
community is underdeveloped,252 its component elements of social
deliberation and public-private partnership show transformative
potential.253
C.

Race Consciousness

The norm of race consciousness forms the core of the ethic of
race-conscious responsibility. This norm stands against the vio
lently contested history of race consciousness in American law.254
114-49 {1996); Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem ofBlack Citizenship, 105 YALE
L.J. 1563 {1996) {book review).
247. Frederick M. Dolan, Political Action and the Unconscious: Arendt and Lacan on
Decentering the Subject, 23 Por.. THEORY 330, 342 {1995).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 343.
251. See John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80
MINN. L. REv. 749, 791-92 (1996) ("Integration makes it possible for those historically ex
cluded from participating in society to be part of a larger community, while necessarily trans
forming that community.").
252. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 91
YALE L.J. 1609 {1988); Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law
Reform for African-Americans?, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1209 (1994); Stephen M. Feldman,
Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J. 1835 (1992).
253. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Trans
formation, 41 STAN. L. REv. 819 {1995).
254. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE {1995); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, supra note 87; T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance ofRacism, 63 CoLo. L.
REv. 325 {1992); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758; see also Jonathan
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The upshot of this contest finds articulation in the "racial rule of
differentiation."255 While subordination often accompanies the ap
plication of the rule of differentiation, differentiation itself does not
necessarily imply subordination. Nor does the dissonance of racial
identity carry such an implication.
The norm of race consciousness hinges on a commitment to
multiracial community that honors differentiation and diversity as
integral parts of collective dialogue. That commitment urges the
exploration of hate speech regulation,256 especially when commu
nity sentiment veers toward violence. The interpretive and physical
violence embodied in the racialized defenses of jury nullification,
victim denigration, and diminished capacity extends the instant
realm of hate speech regulation to the rhetoric of the courtroom.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the regulation of law
yers' courtroom speech from restrictions on lawyers' extra-judicial
statements.257 In contrast to the regulation of extra-judicial com
ment, the regulation of courtroom speech instigates broad fear of
constitutional intrusion.258 Allaying this fear requires a race
conscious defense of state intervention in the private and public ex
ercise of speech rights.259
In this light, consider Owen Fiss's recent defense of state ac
tion.260 Fiss conceives of the "state as parliamentarian," contending

Feldman, Race-Consciousness Versus Colorblindness in the Selection of Civil Rights Leaders:
Reflections upon Jack Greenberg's Crusaders in the Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 151 (1996) (re
view essay).
255. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 36-75 (1995).
256. See, e.g., WoRDs '!HAT WouND (Mari Matsuda et al. eds., 1993); Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE,
SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, C!v:IL RIGHTS, AND C!v:IL LIBERTIES 17 (Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. et al. eds., 1995).
257. Cf. Marcy Strauss, From Witness to Riches: The Constitutionality of Restricting Wit
ness Speech, 38 Aruz. L. REv. 291 (1996); Esther Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the After
math of Gentile: Reconsidering the Efficacy of Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 494
(1993).
258. On the shared social critique of First Amendment doctrine by prewar and post-war
progressives, see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to
the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375; David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive
Social Thought, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 951 (1996).
259. Such a defense addresses state sanctioned acts of racial discrimination as forms of
state action, rather than as " 'neutral background' " facts. Roberts, supra note 187, at 390.
260. Fiss observes:
In intervening in this manner, the state is protecting the speech rights of the blacks,
and it can do so only by restricting the range of speech acts in which racists are allowed
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that the First Amendment principle of democratic self-governance
"does not protect merely choice by citizens, but rather choice made
with adequate information and under suitable conditions of refiec
tion."261 To the extent that racialized defenses constitute an unin
formed and unreflective hate-speech-inspired choice of lawyer and
client citizens, the justification for governmental regulation gathers
force.262
Nevertheless, some may object that application of the rule of
racial differentiation to regulate hate speech constitutes an " 'inva
sive preference.' "263 Pointing to the lawyer-client relationship,
Luban defines an invasive preference as "an individual preference
for an option that someone else has excluded as a matter of
right."264 He finds evidence of invasive preference when a lawyer
overrides the stated preference of a client. Override, Cathy Mans
field suggests, may consist of the "act of taking utilitarian control of
a client's story by placing legal construct upon it. "265 Construed as
an act of client domination, utilitarian control may arise in other
substantive law areas outside of the criminal law.266 Whatever the
substantive law at stake, the crux of hate speech regulation con
cerns securing voluntary lawyer-client agreement to refrain from
harmful, racialized rhetoric. The next section examines the possi
bility of reaching such agreement through shared spirituality.

to engage. In favoring the speech rights of blacks in this way, the state is not making a
judgment about the merit - constitutional or other - of the views each side is likely to
express, through "fighting words" or otherwise, but only that this sector of the commu
nity must be heard from more fully if the public is to make an informed choice about an
entire range of issues on the public agenda, from affirmative action, to education, to
welfare policy. The state is acting as a parliamentarian trying to end a pattern of behav
ior that silences one group and thus distorts or skews public debate. The state is not
trying to usurp the public's right of collective self-determination, but rather to enhance
the public's capacity to properly exercise that right.
Owen FJSs, The Supreme Court and the Problem ofHate Speech, 24 CAPITAL U.

L. REV. 281,

288 (1995).
261. Id. at 288-89.
262. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role ofGovernmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996).
263. David Luban, Social Choice Theory as Jurisprudence, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 551
(1996).
264. Id.
265. Mansfield, supra note 46, at 918. Mansfield argues: "The act of taking utilitarian
control of a client's story by placing legal construct upon it is legitimate only if the attorney
distills and interprets the client's story toward the client's goal." Id. at 918 (footnote
omitted).
266. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 16 B.U. L. REv. 347 (1996).
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Spirituality

The norm of spirituality completes the ethic of race-conscious
responsibility. Contemporary writing on ethics evinces a tum to
spirituality in law and the legal profession.267 A similar shift is visi
ble in the medical profession.268 In jurisprudence, however, the
shift marks a departure from formalism and instrumentalism
prompted by the search for values absent from or external to law.269
Images of spirituality in law may be traced to "the prophetic
vision of justice" in American legal culture.210 The desire for spiri
tual fulfillment fills that vision, moving from the ground up out of
the drive for self-alteration and context-transcendence in the pur
suit of human fiourishing,211 a pursuit basic to the human character.
Transcendence involves more than the self. At bottom, spiritu
ality is tied to the notion of communion and community-building.212
Without communion with others, the investigation of alternative
types of relationships that neither devalue nor exclude race makes
no progress. Indeed, the very concept of personhood is contingent
on the flourishing of interracial community.273

267. See, e.g., RADICAL CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY LAWYER (Andrew W. McThenia,
Jr. ed., 1995); Anthony E. Cook, The Spiritual Movement Towards Justice, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1007; Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1259
{1996); Thomas L. Shaffer, Maybe A Lawyer Can Be A Servant; If Not . . , 27 TEX. TECH. L.
REv. 1345 (1996).
.

268. See, e.g., Russell B. Connors, Jr. & Martin L. Smith, Religious Insistence on Medical
Treatment: Christian Theology and Re-Imagination, HASTINGS CENTER REP. , July-Aug. 1996,

at 23.

269. See George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End ofJurisprudence, 29
LoY. L.A. L. REV. 545, 575 {1996) (rejecting both formalism and neo-Wittgensteinian ap
proaches for their refusal to justify decisions on the basis of values external to law or results).
270. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1331,
1353 (1995) (claiming that "the prophetic litigator's main contribution is aiding the develop·
ment of a culture of legal struggle that continually informs and inspires future generations to
challenge oppressive practices").

271. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense ofAr
istotelian Essentialism, 20 Po1.. THEORY 202, 214-23 {1992) (discussing the conditions of
human flourishing).

272. See Paul J. Heald, Idealism and the Individual Woman: Madness and Humanity in
Bessie Head's A Question of Power, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 83, 98-99 (1995).
273. Jane Baron and Jeffrey Dunoff note: "If the flourishing self is constituted in relation
to things and people, then personhood and community are connected; the individual is partly
a product of his or her social world." Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market
Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDozo L. REv.
431, 475 {1996).
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The overarching morality of community resides in the general
obligation to reconcile competing visions of the common good.
This obligation requires lawyers and clients to combat moral disas
sociation274 and to eschew narrow self-interest in advocacy. Only a
reconstructive morality reconciling individual rights and social re
sponsibilities satisfies that obligation.21s
Drawn from the jurisprudence of critical race theory,276 the re
constructive ethic of race-conscious responsibility reasserts the role
of lawyers as custodians of community.277 This custodial responsi
bility requires entry into spiritual dialogue with clients and commu
nities to establish respect for conscience in opposing racial
animus.278 Fashioned from an ethic of care279 increasingly cele
brated in ethics regimes,28° spiritual dialogue brings the potential
for compassion281 and empathy into the play of advocacy. Doubt
less forestalling the conversion of caring into coercion or paternal
ism poses challenges.282 Institutionalizing the ethic of care in state
juridical structures presents even greater challenges.283
274. See LAURENCE MoRDEKHAI THOMAS, VESSELS OF EVIL: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
HOLOCAUST 108-13 (1993).
275. See Amitai Etzioni, A Moderate Communitarian Proposal, 24 PoL. THEORY 155, 161
(1996) (maintaining that "individual rights and social responsibilities, just like individual lib
erties and social definitions of the common good, are not oppositional but complementary or at least they can made to be").
276. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990).
277. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1066-67
(1990); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 835, 873 (1987).
278. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR TiiE
INNOCENT 111-33 (1981); Emily Fowler Hartigan, Muldple Unities in the Law, 36 S. TEX. L.
REV. 999 (1995).
279. See, e.g., VmGINIA HELD, FEMINIST MORALITY: TRANSFORMING CULTURE, SOCI
ETY, AND POLITICS 30-31, 52-54, 168-70 (1993); JUSTICE AND CARE: EsSENTIAL READINGS IN
FEMINIST ETHICS (Virginia Held ed., 1995); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE AP
PROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL EDUCATION (1984); ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMININE AND FEMI·
NIST ETHICS 80-107 (1993).
280. See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J.
2665 (1993).
281. See Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism:
Resurrecdng the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431 (1994).
282. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What's Gen(ier Got to Do with it?: The Politics and
Morality of an Ethic of Care, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 265, 285 (1996) (reviewing
JOAN C. TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE
(1993)).
283. See Christopher H. Wellman, Liberalism, Samaritanism, and Political Legitimacy, 25
PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 211, 213-14 (1996) (arguing that the political legitimacy of state imposition
upon personal liberty turns not merely on the services it provides to the individual but on the
benefits it provides others).
TiiE
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Objections

The ethic of race-conscious responsibility spurs multiple objec
tions. Rather than rehearse past exceptions,284 this section briefly
considers four rapidly emerging objections. The first condemns the
imposition of constraints on a criminal defendant's freedom of
choice in formulating a defense strategy.285 The second assails the
same constraints for encumbering a criminal defendant's right to
trial.286 The third bemoans the heightened danger of lawyer bad
faith in counseling and negotiation,287 particularly concerning mat
ters of plea bargaining and accelerated disposition.288 The fourth
criticizes the introduction of additional counseling variables for in
creasing the risk of incurable error.
Each of these four objections deserves more elaborate treat
ment than is available in this brief article. Nonetheless, the rough
contours of a suitable response may be sketched here. Protests re
garding feared impediments on a criminal defendant's freedom of
choice in devising a defense strategy, however well intentioned,
must concede that client freedom is not ordinarily unfettered. De
fensive strategy effectively rests on the discretionary judgments of
lawyer counsel. The content of that counsel is subject to greater
regulation from statutory code and court sanction than from client
ministration.
Moreover, disquiet over the hindering of a criminal defendant's
right to trial, while legitimate, seems exaggerated. The proposed
ethic does nothing to disturb a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend
ment right to a jury trial. Rather, the ethic limits the tactics obtain
able at trial. Those tactics already fall under the constraining
ethical supervision and evidentiary governance of courts.
Further, worry about the danger of lawyer bad faith in counsel
ing and negotiation, albeit well placed, appears prematbre. No
procurable evidence, empirical or anecdotal, implies bad faith.
Neither does the analogy to plea bargaining, and its associated mis
conduct, offer a basis for such a presumption.
284. See Alfieri, supra note 32, at 1339-40.
285. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Pro

moting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for
All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73 (1993).
286. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Al
ternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931 (1983).
287. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 595

(1993).
288. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion As Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 53-60 (1988).
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Finally, unease concerning the introduction of additional coun
seling variables, and a corresponding increase in the risk of error,
seems groundless. No evidence suggests an escalation of risk. And
no presumption of risk finds empirical support.

In spite

of this in

sufficiency, the grave consequences of ineffective assistance compel
a review of preventive measures, such as enhanced training and su
pervision in counseling practices.
Beyond this truncated response, the above-mentioned objec
tions warrant consideration of the institutional competence of
courts and bar associations in promulgating and enforcing regula
tions governing the racial conduct of lawyers and clients in criminal
defense advocacy.

Consideration extends to the enumeration of

formal procedural protections designed to safeguard against race
based prejudice in the courtroom and the law office. Implementa
tion of such protections requires new administrative systems and
gives rise to the related problems of cost and valuation.
To be sure, the task of assigning a pecuniary value to the defor
mation of racial identity or monetizing harm to racial community is
daunting. Because the nature of the injury is intangible in charac
ter, it exceeds the scope of easy economic calculation. Likewise,
the task of comparing the actual moral worth or culpability of cli
ents and communities presents alarming difficulties.289 Neverthe
less, roughhewn assessment and open discussion of the potential
costs and benefits of racial regulation in the criminal justice system
deserves our attention.
CONCLUSION

This article advances a larger, multipronged investigation of ra
cial truth and justice in the criminal defense representation of his
torical agents of American racial violence. Like prior efforts in this
investigation, the article is plagued by an admitted tension between
modernist intuition and postmodernist disposition. Lisa Frohmann
and Elizabeth Mertz remark that this tension is likely to emerge
whenever "analysis moves all events to the level of discourse, sto
ries, and social categories, turning away completely from questions
of truth and justice while concentrating on issues of construction,
persuasion, and rhetoric."290 Although the discursive or rhetorical
analysis of racialized criminal defense narratives remains critical,

289. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 455, 462 {1996).

290. Lisa Frohmann & Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Reform and Social Construction: Violence,
Gender, and the Law, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 829, 847, 849 n.66 {1994).
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lawyers should not, indeed cannot, turn away from the pursuit of
truth and justice in evaluating race in· America.
The evaluation of the status of race, racialized defense strategy,
and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics of criminal
defense lawyering suffers profound ambiguity in part born of the
tension between modernism and postmodernism within the CRT
movement. Angela Harris observes that the dual · commitment of
race-crits to the modernist, antiracist goals of traditional civil rights
scholarship and to the postmodernist, deconstructive methods of in
ternal critique produces different, perhaps incommensurable, inter
pretive accounts of the legal subject and the practices of objectivity
and neutrality in legal reasoning.291 Embodied in varied narrative
forms, the accounts undermine common faith in Enlightenment
reason and popular belief in historical truth. Rather than revive the
canons of modernism or reject the critical tools of postmodernism,
Harris urges race-crits not only to "inhabit" or "live in the tension"
generated by modem-postmodern jurisprudential ambiguity, but
also to take hold of its reconstructive potential.292
Here, as well as in other remedial contexts of normative pre
scription, modern-postmodern jurisprudential ambiguity confounds
the practical investigation of race, particularly study of the in
grained lawyer habits of race-baiting and the discursive traces of
racist ideology in advocacy. CRT scholars studying racial remedies,
for example, note conceptual uncertainty in the competing notions
of affirmative action and discrimination. Indeed, Girardeau Spann
notes that unstable goals and mixed motives may sometimes erase
the difference between affirmative action and discrimination.293
Like justice-based remedial measures, advocacy strategies some
times require redefinition. The project of redefinition entails a dis
trust of tradition verging on self-paternalism. The growing cry for
the regulation of the self in advocacy signals the move to nonmate
rial, psychological claims of spiritual redress294 on behalf of clients
and their communities. Engaging the narratives of individuals and
communities of color in critical dialogue demands an understanding
of both black and white racial identity. Ultimately, only an under291. See Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L.

REY. 741, 745·60 {1994).
292. See id. at 760.

293. See Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 65
{1995).
294. See generally Kathy Laster & Pat O'Malley, Sensitive New-age Laws: The Reasser
tion of Emotionality in Law, 24 INTL. J. Soc. L. 21, 28 {1996).
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standing of the politics of identity will break the silence of racial
subordination in law and ethics.29s

295. Anthony Chase urges breaking "the precious rule of silence" in law. Chase, supra
note 87, at 47. He remarks: "The day may come when race will no longer be an issue, but
that will be after the process of restructuring our collective unconscious is completed - after
the seeds of racism, instilled centuries ago, have been eradicated." Id.

